Local governments often adopt selective and flexible strategies when implementing centrally mandated policies, leading to execution biases that impede precise adherence to central directives. This study examines local execution bias under aggregate target responsibilities through the Grain for Green Project. Our findings indicate that while the project substantially increases forest and grass cover, this growth primarily occurs on slopes below 25 degrees, with limited impact on slopes exceeding 25 degrees—a primary engineering target. Economic incentives emerge as the main drivers behind the execution bias, with political incentives playing a secondary role. Execution biases are most prominent in regions with high fiscal self-sufficiency, a significant proportion of earmarked transfer payments, and a large share of agricultural taxes. In contrast, regions with a strong rule of law, low administrative fragmentation, and robust institutional constraints experience fewer challenges. These findings underscore the need to balance overarching target management with detailed oversight to ensure effective policy implementation.
 

Aggregate Target, Execution Bias, Earmarked Transfer, Grain-for-Green Project